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Resolving conﬂicts 
of law arising 
from same-sex 
relationships
BY ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR HILLEL Y. LEVIN
s anyone following the news 
knows, same-sex marriage is a hot 
topic. President Barack Obama 
declared his support for same-sex 
marriage in 2012, the ﬁrst time a major 
party’s presidential nominee has done 
so. Public support is at unprecedented 
levels, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
is currently considering two cases 
concerning the legal status of same-sex 
relationships. 
Although the Supreme Court could declare that all states 
must recognize same-sex marriage, few observers believe that it is 
quite ready to take that step. Thus, whatever the Supreme Court 
decides, little is likely to change from the current status quo, 
which is, in a word, confusing. 
The Dilemma
A few states (what I call the “marriage states”) permit same-
sex couples to wed; some others (the “marriage-like” states) 
instead offer same-sex couples alternatives that are functionally 
identical to marriage, or nearly so, but under a different 
name, like civil unions; still others (the “marriage-lite” states) 
provide same-sex couples with only a handful of the rights 
and responsibilities typically associated with marriage; and 
the majority of states – Georgia included – offer no formal 
recognition at all to same-sex couples. 
A
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Over the next few years, as the country continues to grapple 
with issues related to same-sex relationships, more states are likely 
to experiment with these alternative models. 
This state of affairs raises complex and novel questions for 
courts, legislatures and other policymakers in a technical and 
somewhat esoteric area of the law called conﬂicts of law. 
What happens when a same-sex couple married in a marriage 
state moves to a marriage-like state; or from a marriage-like to 
a marriage-lite state; or from a marriage-lite to a marriage state 
– and so on? Do they keep their rights and responsibilities? Do 
they lose them as they cross the border? Does it depend, and if so, 
on what? Consider these examples:
???????????????????? ?????????? ???????????????? ????????
state) and moves to Delaware (a marriage-like state). One 
spouse is incapacitated and hospitalized. Can the other 
spouse direct medical care and make end-of-life decisions? 
Can he even visit his husband in the hospital? What if the 
incapacitated spouse dies? Who inherits? Who assumes the 
decedent’s debts? 
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
to Wisconsin (a marriage-lite state) instead.
????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
Delaware and moves to Massachusetts. Before ofﬁcially 
getting married, they decide to split up. One member of the 
couple wishes to marry someone else. Can she? Must she 
dissolve her union in Delaware ﬁrst? If so, how and where?
????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
Wisconsin and then moves to Delaware or Massachusetts. 
What rights, if any, do the members of the couple 
automatically enjoy in the new state?
These are what I refer to as the marriage/marriage-like/
marriage-lite conﬂicts. 
Resolving them is enormously important. As U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Robert Jackson argued in Estin v. Estin (334 
U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting)) more than 60 
years ago, “[i]f there is one thing that the people are entitled to 
expect from their lawmakers, it is rules of law that will enable 
individuals to tell whether they are married and, if so, to whom.”
 In a 2011 article in the Florida Law Review, I offered the ﬁrst 
analytical framework for resolving all of these marriage/marriage-
like/marriage-lite conﬂicts. 
By comparing these marriage conﬂicts to other kinds of 
conﬂicts that present similar patterns, I argued that forum states 
should, to the degree possible, sever those elements of same-sex 
relationships entered into in foreign states that are contrary to 
local policy but accept the remainder. 
This approach provides sensible, straightforward and fairly 
comprehensive rules for addressing the marriage/marriage-like/
marriage-lite conﬂicts, and it also shines a light on how no-
recognition states like Georgia ought to treat same-sex couples 
who have formalized their relationships in other states.
Current Approaches to Solving the Issues
The article began by reviewing the approaches taken by the
various states to these questions and demonstrating that the law 
was in disarray. 
For example, consider how states have resolved the most 
straightforward conﬂict, that between a marriage and marriage-
like state (when a married same-sex couple moves from a 
marriage state to a marriage-like state). Analytically, states have 
three options in confronting this problem. 
First, they might treat the couple as married. That is,
although the forum state would not perform the marriage, it 
could recognize and adopt the status afforded by the marriage 
state as a matter of comity. 
Second, they could decline to recognize the relationship
altogether. In other words, because the forum state does not 
permit same-sex couples to marry, it could simply reject the 
relationship entirely and maintain that the couple must formally 
enter into the forum state’s marriage-like union if they are to
receive the beneﬁts of such a relationship. 
Third, they could opt not to recognize the marriage as such, 
but instead automatically provide the maximum recognition for 
the couple afforded in the forum state. For example, a marriage-
like state such as Delaware could automatically treat a same-sex 
couple lawfully married in Massachusetts as though it had 
already entered into Delaware’s marriage alternative. 
Unfortunately, as my research showed, states have been all
over the map concerning this question. 
“Over the next few years, as the country continues to grapple 
with issues related to same-sex relationships, more states are 
likely to experiment with … alternative models.” 
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The various other conﬂict patterns – marriage-like/marriage, 
marriage/marriage-lite, marriage-lite/marriage, etc. – raise even 
more possibilities, and states are to an even greater degree split, 
confused or unclear in how to resolve them.
The central insight in my article is that the conﬂicts presented 
by the states’ differing approaches to same-sex relationships are 
not actually novel, but that legal scholars and judges have been 
looking to the wrong precedents. 
The typical approach offered by legal scholars and judges 
focuses on what are called the incidents of marriage cases. 
These are cases in which an interracial couple, ﬁrst cousins or 
a polygamous group married in a forum that permitted their 
union, but litigation related to the union subsequently arose in a 
forum that rejects such relationships. 
It is easy to see why these cases are attractive to scholars 
and judges as starting points for resolving 
the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-
lite conﬂicts. After all, they too consider 
conﬂicts questions arising 
from different states’ marriage 
recognition laws. 
As I show, though, the incidents 
of marriage cases are of limited 
utility. 
To begin with, they are 
notoriously fragmentary and 
inconsistent. Scholars have 
struggled to make sense of these cases and to develop generally 
applicable rules, and doing so is something like recreating a 
complex statutory scheme by referencing a small number of cases 
in which the statute was applied. 
Further, scholars inevitably make contestable claims about 
how to categorize cases and what to learn from them. These cases 
are too few, too thinly reasoned, and too inconsistent to offer 
much insight. 
More fundamentally, the incidents of marriage cases are 
not, on close examination, sufﬁciently similar to the marriage/
marriage-like/marriage-lite conﬂicts to reason from them. In 
those earlier cases, the states’ possible approaches were strictly 
binary – states either recognized the relationships in question 
as marriages or they rejected them as nothing – whereas the 
possibilities in the same-sex relationship context run along a 
spectrum. 
Therefore, mechanically applying the principles from the 
marriage/no-recognition conﬂicts in the incidents of marriage 
context to the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conﬂicts in 
the same-sex relationship context makes little sense and does not 
comport with the technical doctrines of conﬂicts law.
Using Conflicts of Law Doctrines and Principles  
as a Solution
I suggest that in a variety of overlooked cases, conﬂicts of law 
doctrines and principles have developed that shed light on the 
marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conﬂicts context. 
First, consider a simple problem that arises with respect to 
contracts. Parties sometimes enter into a contract in a foreign 
state that contains a clause that a forum state adjudicating the 
contract deems unenforceable and contrary to public policy. 
Should the court in the forum state (1) put aside its objections 
to the problematic clause on the grounds that it should give full 
force to a sister state’s law; (2) reject the contract entirely; or (3) 
sever the unenforceable clause and give full force to what is left of 
the contract? 
It should be immediately apparent that these possible 
resolutions mirror the options we identiﬁed in the 
marriage/marriage-like context. 
In these contract disputes, courts often sever the 
unenforceable provision such that the remainder of 
the contract will be valid and enforceable. In other 
words, the court will conform the contract, where 
possible, to local law and policy. In so doing, a state 
can uphold its interest in enforcing agreements 
between parties while simultaneously afﬁrming its 
opposition to the particular provision in question.
Consider a second example, this time from 
family law. The states vary somewhat with regard to 
precisely which rights travel along with marriage. Some states are 
community property states, while others are common law states. 
If a couple were to move from the ﬁrst kind to the second, 
the latter would recognize the couple as married, but would 
typically apply its own law were a dispute about the property to 
arise. In other words, the mere fact that the forum state might not 
recognize one aspect of the relationship is not enough for the state 
to refuse to recognize the relationship altogether. Once again, we 
ﬁnd the forum state rejecting that which conﬂicts with its policies 
and embracing that which it can.
We can readily apply the lessons from these relatively 
uncontroversial cases to the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite 
conﬂicts context. Simply put, states should reject those elements 
of a solemnized relationship that offend their public policy and 
accept those that conform to it. 
Thus, for the marriage/marriage-like conﬂict, the forum state 
should refuse to apply the marriage label to the couple, but it 
should extend all of the beneﬁts that it would offer to similarly 
situated same-sex couples under local law. In other words, it 
should treat the couple as having automatically entered into its 
marriage-like alternative. 
“[T]he states’ differing 
approaches to same-sex 
relationships are not 
actually novel … ” 
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The same rule should apply in the marriage/marriage-lite and 
marriage-like/marriage-lite conﬂicts cases. That is, the marriage-
lite forum state should not recognize the marriage or marriage-like 
label, or even the full array of rights and responsibilities that the 
couple attained under the foreign state’s marriage or marriage-like 
scheme. It should, however, extend all of the beneﬁts that it offers 
to same-sex couples within its own marriage-lite alternative and that 
are subsumed within the marriage or marriage-like relationship into 
which the couple already entered. 
Similarly, with respect to the marriage-like/marriage conﬂict 
(where a couple enters into a marriage-like relationship and then 
ﬁnds themselves in a marriage state), the marriage state should 
automatically treat the couple as though they were married. 
Once again, the marriage state would simply be conforming the 
relationship to local law.
However, with respect to the marriage-lite/marriage-like and 
marriage-lite/marriage conﬂicts, the marriage and marriage-like 
forum states should refuse to extend any recognition to the couple 
that has entered elsewhere into a marriage-lite relationship. 
This is because (1) marriage-lite relationships offend the policies 
of marriage and marriage-like states, such that the state should not 
recognize the marriage-lite status itself, and (2) the couple has not 
shown any interest in undertaking the much more robust marriage-
like or marriage relationship. That is, the marriage-like or marriage 
forum cannot sever some piece of the marriage-lite relationship 
that it objects to and thus leave some larger piece that it can 
recognize; there is simply no equivalence in the relationships. 
However, there is one critical exception to this rule: if 
the marriage or marriage-like forum state would allow 
individuals to enter into a contractual relationship 
governing the speciﬁc right at issue independently of a 
marriage or marriage alternative relationship, then it 
should recognize the foreign marriage-lite relationship’s 
granting of that right. 
For instance, if the forum state permits individuals 
to appoint someone to make end-of-life decisions 
independently of marriage (as all states do), and if the 
foreign marriage-lite relationship provides for end-
of-life decision-making, then the forum state should 
afﬁrm that aspect of the relationship as a contractual 
matter.
Finally, this approach yields important insights 
even for states, like Georgia, that decline to recognize any 
form of same-sex relationship. 
The truth is that even no-recognition states have laws 
that recognize, or at least protect, some aspects of same-
sex relationships. 
Same-sex couples can provide for each other in their wills, 
and these wills are respected in no-recognition states. Likewise, 
no-recognition states respect legal agreements directing decision-
making in the event of incapacity, contracts governing property 
division and other private agreements into which same-sex couples 
may enter. 
Therefore, no-recognition states should automatically treat 
couples who have lawfully entered into marriage, marriage-like, 
and marriage-lite relationships in other states as though they had 
entered into whatever private contracts would be included in those 
unions and by forum law. That is, a same-sex couple that marries 
in Massachusetts and moves to Georgia should automatically have 
whatever rights and responsibilities Georgia independently allows 
same-sex couples to privately contract for and that are inherent in 
Massachusetts marriage law. 
Of course, this is only a small subset of the rights and 
responsibilities that accrue to married couples; but they are very 
real nonetheless.
In my view, this approach is fairly intuitive and offers a more 
comprehensive and straightforward approach than those offered 
by others. But it will likely make very few partisans in the same-sex 
marriage debates happy. 
Those who wish to see same-sex marriage spread throughout 
the country may well prefer an argument that every 
state is required to recognize a same-sex marriage 
lawfully performed in another state. 
On the other side, some who oppose same-
sex marriage and other forms of recognition 
may protest that my approach allows 
a sort of “creep” in the recognition of 
same-sex relationships, requiring states 
that have expressly rejected same-sex 
marriage to recognize such relationships 
in some cases. 
To partisans of these debates, I 
simply suggest that conﬂicts law, given 
its opacity, complexity and technicality, 
is not the appropriate terrain on which to 
ﬁght the marriage wars. 
Indeed, I hope all states will recognize 
same-sex marriage one day soon, but based 
on equality – not through conﬂicts law.
Resolving these conﬂicts requires careful 
attention to the most technical areas of 
the law, creative problem-solving and the 
application of common sense. In other 
words, it requires good lawyering.
“The truth is that even no-recognition states have laws that recognize, 
or at least protect, some aspects of same-sex relationships.” 
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